Bringing the â€œselfâ€ into focus: conceptualising the role of self-experience for understanding and working with distressing voices by Sarah F. Fielding-Smith et al.
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 07 August 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01129
Edited by:
Frank Larøi,
University of Liege, Belgium
Reviewed by:
Giancarlo Dimaggio,
Centro di Terapia Metacognitiva
Interpersonale, Italy
Emma Barkus,
University of Wollongong, Australia
*Correspondence:
Sarah F. Fielding-Smith,
School of Psychology, University
of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
s.fielding-smith@sussex.ac.uk
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Psychopathology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 28 February 2015
Accepted: 20 July 2015
Published: 07 August 2015
Citation:
Fielding-Smith SF, Hayward M,
Strauss C, Fowler D, Paulik G
and Thomas N (2015) Bringing
the “self” into focus: conceptualising
the role of self-experience
for understanding and working with
distressing voices.
Front. Psychol. 6:1129.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01129
Bringing the “self” into focus:
conceptualising the role
of self-experience for understanding
and working with distressing voices
Sarah F. Fielding-Smith 1*, Mark Hayward 1,2, Clara Strauss 1,2, David Fowler 1,2, Georgie
Paulik 3,4 and Neil Thomas 5,6
1 School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, 2 Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust, Hove, UK, 3 School
of Psychology, University of Western Australia, Perth, WA, Australia, 4 Schizophrenia Research Institute, Darlinghurst, NSW,
Australia, 5 Brain and Psychological Sciences Research Centre, Swinburne University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia, 6 Monash
Alfred Psychiatry Research Centre, The Alfred, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
A primary goal of cognitive behavior therapy for psychosis (CBTp) is to reduce distress
and disability, not to change the positive symptoms of psychosis, such as hearing
voices. Despite demonstrated associations between beliefs about voices and distress,
the effects of CBTp on reducing voice distress are disappointing. Research has begun
to explore the role that the psychological construct of “self” (which includes numerous
facets such as self-reflection, self-schema and self-concept) might play in causing and
maintaining distress and disability in voice hearers. However, attempts to clarify and
integrate these different perspectives within the voice hearing literature, or to explore
their clinical implications, are still in their infancy. This paper outlines how the self has
been conceptualised in the psychosis and CBT literatures, followed by a review of the
evidence regarding the proposed role of this construct in the etiology of and adaptation
to voice hearing experiences. We go on to discuss some of the specific intervention
methods that aim to target these aspects of self-experience and end by identifying
key research questions in this area. Notably, we suggest that interventions specifically
targeting aspects of self-experience, including self-affection, self-reflection, self-schema
and self-concept, may be sufficient to reduce distress and disruption in the context of
hearing voices, a suggestion that now requires further empirical investigation.
Keywords: self, self-experience, voice hearing, auditory verbal hallucinations, psychosis, schizophrenia,
phenomenology, psychological intervention
Introduction
Voice hearing experiences are common in a range of mental health conditions (Waters et al., 2012a),
and often contribute significantly to distress, disability and need for care (Nayani and David, 1996).
Cognitive behavioral therapy for psychosis (CBTp) is the recommended first-line psychological
treatment for distressing voice hearing experiences occurring in the context of psychotic disorder
(American PsychiatricAssociation, 2004; Royal Australian andNewZealandCollege of Psychiatrists,
2005; National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2014). When working with people
distressed by voice hearing experiences, this approach aims to modify appraisals about the
identity, power, knowledge and intent of voices, as these are proposed to determine the degree
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of distress and interference with functioning experienced by the
hearer (Thomas et al., 2014).
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are consistent in
demonstrating evidence for beneficial but modest effects of
CBTp on global measures of voice hearing experiences (van
der Gaag et al., 2014). Some RCTs have found evidence for
changes in physical, cognitive and behavioral, but not emotional,
dimensions of voices (Valmaggia et al., 2005; Peters et al., 2010),
a surprising finding given that symptom-related distress is the
intended outcome of CBTp. Farhall et al. (2009) suggest that this
might be due, in part, to insufficient attention toward targeting
voice-related mechanisms in CBTp trials. However, whilst a
recent trial targeting a specific type of voice appraisal (voice
power beliefs) in people experiencing command hallucinations
found a significant reduction in compliance behavior, again, no
significant treatment effect was found on voice-related distress
(Birchwood et al., 2014).
Given these modest treatment effects, and in particular the
limited impact of therapy on voice distress, researchers have
suggested that the development of interventions should be further
guided by research on processes specific to voice hearing (Thomas
et al., 2014). One potential therapeutic approach is suggested
by evidence of a range of disturbances in self-experience in
people diagnosed with psychosis, including perceived loss of
self-coherence, self-identity and self-esteem, amongst other self-
related constructs (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013b). Since voice
hearing is one of the defining features of schizophrenia (it has
been estimated that approximately 60% of those receiving this
diagnosis hear voices; Slade and Bentall, 1988), it is possible
that disturbances in self-experience are in some way related to
the emergence of and adaptation to voice hearing experiences
in (and possibly beyond) psychosis. Indeed, many researchers
have posited a central role of self-disturbance in the development
of voice hearing experiences in schizophrenia (Sass and Parnas,
2003; Raballo and Larøi, 2011; Larøi et al., 2012; Perona-Garcelán
et al., 2015), and cognitive models of psychosis emphasize the role
of anomalous self-experiences and beliefs about the self in the
nature of and adaptation to voices (Garety et al., 2001; Morrison,
2001; Paulik, 2012).
This evidence suggests that self-experience might represent
a viable target for therapeutic intervention in voice hearing.
Such a therapeutic focus on self-experience confers several
advantages. If disturbances of self-experience do indeed represent
the core vulnerability underlying psychotic experiences such
as voices, targeting self-experience may have broader effects
extending to other symptoms associated with voice hearing,
such as paranoia, negative symptoms, depression and anxiety.
Furthermore, targeting self-experience may be an alternative, less
confronting, means of reducing distress with persons for whom
beliefs about voices are maintained with delusional conviction, or
who do not wish to engage directly with their voices in therapy.
This is also consistent with evolutions of cognitive therapy which
see a focus on self-acceptance and a richer understanding of self
as an integral part of a person-based approach (Chadwick, 2003,
2006).
However, cognitive behavioral research and intervention to
date has typically focused on only two elements of self-experience
in voice hearing; negative self-schema and self-esteem, largely
neglecting significant advances in the understanding of self-
experience from research in phenomenological psychiatry and
cognitive and social psychology (García-Montes et al., 2012).
Furthermore, the sheer range of concepts embraced by the concept
of “self-experience” currently precludes attempts to move beyond
this preliminary understanding within the voice hearing literature
(Berry and Bucci, 2014). Developing a shared conceptualisation
of how these various elements of self-experience relate to one
another, and the role that these might play in voice hearing
experiences, may help to develop intervention strategies that
target these aspects more efficiently. The current paper therefore
aims to bring together some of the diverse literature on self-
experience, in order to present a conceptual framework for
understanding and researching self-experience in voice hearers.
The paper will first outline the current conceptualisation
of self-experience in the cognitive behavioral literature, before
introducing a framework for understanding the structure of self-
experience, based on research in phenomenological psychiatry,
cognitive science and social psychology. This framework will
be discussed in relation to research findings on disturbed self-
experience in psychosis and voice hearing. We will consider a
range of potential treatment targets suggested by this framework,
and discuss how current intervention strategies may directly
or indirectly target these mechanisms. The paper concludes
with a discussion of the future research that will be necessary
to validate this framework within voice hearers and identify
effective intervention strategies to target elements of disturbed
self-experience.
Current Conceptualisations of “self” in
CBT for Psychosis
Whilst many researchers within the cognitive behavioral tradition
have investigated the relationship between voices and elements
of self-experience such as self-schema and self-esteem, Beck,
Bentall, Chadwick and colleagues are amongst the few who have
attempted to integrate these constructs within a cohesive cognitive
framework (Bentall et al., 1994; Beck and Rector, 2003; Bentall,
2003; Chadwick, 2003, 2006; Beck et al., 2008). These authors
build on work from cognitive and social psychology in order to
describe the content, organization and functioning of the self-
concept in people experiencing psychosis.
Social cognitive models propose that the self-concept
comprises a collection of abstract and language-based cognitive
representations stored in memory which serve to interpret and
organize self-relevant actions and experiences (Markus andWurf,
1987). These self-representations concern various aspects of
individuals’ relations with the outside world and with themselves
(Higgins, 1987; Beck et al., 2008), including representations of
“actual” self (i.e., the specific model of the self that we currently
hold inmind), “ideal” self (the self that I would like to be), “ought”
self (the self that I ought to be) and “possible” self (the self that I
imagine I might become in the future). These representations are
proposed to be constructed via continuous reciprocal interaction
between the self and the social world (Markus and Wurf, 1987).
What results from this process of construction is a dynamic
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interpretive structure that both derives from and mediates
most significant intra- and inter-personal functions, including
information processing, affective and behavioral regulation,
social perception, and the selection of, and behavior within,
social interactions (Markus and Wurf, 1987).
These various self-representations are proposed to be organized
within higher-order cognitive structures, which Beck et al.
(2008) referred to as schemas. At any one time, only a
subset of self-schema are accessed and invoked, depending
on both the self-motives being served and the particular
demands and affordances of the immediate social situation
(Markus and Wurf, 1987). Chadwick (2006) reserves the term
schema for the cognitive–affective experience of self that we
are aware of in any given moment as a particular subset of
self-representations become activated. This continually shifting
experience of self, which can include associated cognitive,
affective and physiological states, has alternatively been referred
to as the working self-concept (Markus and Wurf, 1987; Bentall,
2003).
Contemporary cognitive models emphasize the significance of
recognizing the complex and dynamic nature of the self-concept
(Bentall, 2003; Chadwick, 2006). For example, a distinction has
recently beenmade in the psychosis literature between knowledge
and evaluative components of the self-concept (Fowler et al.,
2006). Whilst the stored schematic representations described
previously make up the knowledge component of the self (i.e.,
what people believe about themselves), the evaluative component
comprises constructs such as self-esteem (i.e., how people
feel about what they believe about themselves; Maddux and
Gosselin, 2012) and self-efficacy beliefs (i.e., what people believe
they can do and achieve with their skills and abilities under
certain conditions; Maddux and Gosselin, 2012). It has been
suggested that the accessibility of, and interactions between, these
diverse knowledge-based and evaluative self-representations is as
central to functioning as schematic content (Chadwick, 2006).
Self-representations will differ in terms of their tendency to
become activated or to enter conscious awareness, and different
self-representations may be contradictory or poorly integrated,
potentially resulting in the actuation of negative emotional states
(Bentall, 2003).
These concepts have been explored predominantly within
the paranoia and persecutory delusions literature (e.g., Bentall
et al., 2001; Freeman et al., 2002; Tiernan et al., 2014).
Early cognitive models proposed that persecutory delusions
reflect an attributional defense, preventing latent negative self-
representations from entering conscious awareness (Bentall et al.,
1994, 2001). More recent theories (e.g., Freeman et al., 2002)
suggest that paranoia and delusions do not serve a defensive
function, but instead build directly upon negative beliefs about
the self (e.g., that the self is weak or vulnerable), whereby such
beliefs may lead to an experience of oneself as an “easy target” in
interpersonal interactions, in turn prompting the anticipation of
threat that characterizes persecutory delusions (Salvatore et al.,
2012b). In support of the latter theory, empirical work has
consistently demonstrated the presence of both negative explicit
and implicit self-representations in individuals with paranoia
(Tiernan et al., 2014).
In relation to voice hearing specifically, research to date
(recently reviewed by Berry and Bucci, 2014) suggests a close
link between negative knowledge-based self representations and
voice content (Close and Garety, 1998; Barrowclough et al., 2003),
appraisals of voice power (Birchwood et al., 2000, 2004; Thomas
et al., 2015), and emotional and behavioral responses to voices
such as distress (Birchwood et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2006)
and compliance (Fox et al., 2004). Whilst some descriptions of
the cognitive model suggest a reciprocal relationship between
voices and self-beliefs, whereby negative self-schema are suggested
to influence both voice content (Beck and Rector, 2003) and
appraisals of voices (e.g., Morrison, 2001), and negative voices
reinforce and strengthen negative distressing core beliefs about
the self (Close and Garety, 1998; Freeman et al., 2002; Chadwick,
2006), the directionality of these effects have yet to be established
empirically.
Research into the relationship between the evaluative
component of the self-concept and voice hearing experiences
has focused predominantly on self-esteem. Recent research has
found evidence of an association between low trait self-esteem
and negative voice content (Smith et al., 2006), power appraisals
(Peters et al., 2012) and distress (Smith et al., 2006), whilst Fannon
et al. (2009) found that low self-esteem predicted depression
in voice hearers independently of voice appraisals. To date,
there has been less of a focus on the role of self-efficacy beliefs
(another aspect of the evaluative component of the self-concept)
in voice hearing, although this is frequently stated as a target
for psychological therapy (e.g., Chadwick, 2003; Hayward et al.,
2009). However, self-efficacy beliefs have been shown to be an
important variable in determining whether voice hearers require
psychiatric care (Honig and Romme, 1998), and have been
suggested to be undermined by enduring experiences of critical
or commanding voices (Rector and Leahy, 2006).
Bringing the “self” into Focus: A
Phenomenologically-informed Framework
These conceptualisations of self within the CBTp literature
emphasize the role of stored higher-level representations,
evaluations and reflective processes in the experience of self.
This is not surprising, since cognitive behavioral approaches are
typically reliant on processes of conscious self-reflection to foster
insight and facilitate change (Chadwick, 2006). However, it is
widely acknowledged that stored knowledge and evaluations are
only one aspect of self-experience (Sedikides and Skowronski,
1997; Damasio, 2003), and much more fundamental disturbances
of self are also characteristic of psychosis (Moe and Docherty,
2014; Nelson et al., 2014). Indeed, the negative or disordered
higher level self-representations which have been described
may develop in reaction to more fundamental, pre-reflective
disturbances in experience of self (Nelson et al., 2014; Stanghellini
and Rosfort, 2015). Specifically, parallel developments in the
fields of phenomenological psychiatry and cognitive psychology
suggest that these disturbances in self-experience might well: (a)
underlie the emergence of and adaptation to voice hearing; (b)
contribute to additional distress/disruption in those who hear
voices.
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Whilst anomalous self-experiences are acknowledged to be an
important pre-disposing factor in cognitive models of psychosis
(Garety et al., 2001; Paulik, 2012), little attempt has been made
to fully integrate these higher and lower-level conceptualisations
of self in relation to voice hearing experiences, despite the
suggestion that it is the interaction between bottom-up and top-
town representations and processes that ultimately determines
the perception of and adaptation to voice hearing experiences
(Waters et al., 2012a; Aleman and Vercammen, 2013). The aim
here is therefore to introduce a framework for conceptualising
the contribution of various dimensions of self-experience to
voice hearing, incorporating insights from phenomenological
psychiatry, cognitive, social and developmental psychology.
These literatures present a vast array of overlapping definitions,
perspectives and explanations of the self, each with their own
associated terminology. Despite this range of perspectives, the
majority appear to assume that there is some elementary form
of order, structure, or “essence” to our experience (or “sense”) of
self, which remains relatively consistent both within and between
individuals (Markus and Wurf, 1987; Damasio, 2003; Gallagher
and Zahavi, 2012). Furthermore, there appears to be a certain
degree of convergence between disciplines around how we might
begin to conceptualise this fundamental structure of self.
For the present purpose, self-experience, or sense of self, is
defined as the feelings of singularity, coherence, individuality,
and unity that define one as a unique and particular human
being (Harré, 1998; Damasio, 2003; Prebble et al., 2013). The
present framework takes as its basis Parnas’s (2003) description
of the structure of the self, which is founded on insights from
phenomenological investigations of self-experience within both
healthy individuals and those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia
(Sass and Parnas, 2003). This framework corresponds closely to
those derived independently within the fields of social psychology
(e.g., Sedikides and Skowronski, 1997) and cognitive neuroscience
(Damasio, 1999), and thus sits on firm empirical ground. This
framework posits that there are three inter-dependent levels of
self-experience, termed the pre-reflective, reflective, and narrative
selves. These will each be described in turn, and evidence for
their role in relation to the emergence of and adaptation to voice
hearing experiences examined.
The Pre-reflective Self
According to Parnas (2003), the pre-reflective self (also referred
to as minimal, ecological, basic, or proto self, selfhood or self-as-
subject; James, 1890; Gibson, 1986; Damasio, 1999; Nelson et al.,
2014; Stanghellini and Rosfort, 2015) constitutes the foundational
level of selfhood on which other levels of self-experience are built
(Nelson et al., 2014) and as such is the basis of various aspects of
conscious experience (Nelson et al., 2014a). It is a pre-conceptual,
tacit level of selfhood that refers to the implicit sense of being a
subject of experience, i.e., a non-inferential first-person awareness
that our on-going experiences, thoughts, perceptions, feelings, or
actions are our own, accompanied by a sense of immersion in the
surrounding world (Parnas, 2003).
A body of phenomenological research provides evidence
of disturbances at the level of pre-reflective self-experience
in people diagnosed with schizophrenia, which manifest as a
range of anomalous subjective experiences (Nelson et al., 2009).
These experiences include disturbed presence (disrupted sense
of “inhabiting” ones own experience), corporeality (anomalous
bodily experiences, such as perceived morphological change
or motor disturbances), stream of consciousness (anomalous
cognitive processes, such as perceptualization of inner speech
or thought, or thought interference), self-demarcation (loss
or permeability of self-world boundary, such as confusion
between oneself and other people), and existential reorientation
(fundamental reorientation with respect to worldview). Sass and
Parnas (2003) propose that these basic disturbances in ipseity lie
at the core of voice hearing experiences, and may even be a trait
marker for psychotic vulnerability (Nelson et al., 2014). In line
with this, Kim et al. (2010) have found a significant association
between anomalous self-experiences and voice hearing (but
not delusions) in patients with schizophrenia, and Raballo and
Larøi (2011) present evidence from first-person accounts that
anomalous self-experiences could prelude to the development of
voice hearing experiences. Varese et al. (2011) have demonstrated
using the experience sampling method (ESM) that patients
with auditory hallucinations are more vulnerable to dissociative
states (an example of disrupted self experience) in response
to daily life stress compared to non-hallucinating patients and
healthy controls. Furthermore, within the hallucinating patient
group, auditory hallucinations were significantly predicted by
dissociation, especially under high stress.
Distorted or unstable self-experience is proposed to result
from two complementary aspects (Sass, 2014): diminished self-
affection (a weakened sense of existing as a subject of awareness or
agent of action) and operative hyper-reflexivity (a non-volitional
tendency for focal attention to be directed toward processes
and phenomena that are normally tacit or implicit). Gallagher
and Zahavi (2012) propose that in the case of voice hearing
experiences, diminished self-affection reflects a disturbance in
the pre-reflective sense of agency (i.e., the sense of being the
agent of an action) over inner speech, with ownership of these
experiences (i.e., the sense that I am the one who is undergoing
these experiences) remaining relatively intact. This proposition
is evidenced by the observation that in general, voice hearers
remain aware that they, themselves, are hearing voices, rather than
somebody else. This disrupted sense of agency, in combination
with operative hyper-reflexivity, is suggested to underlie the
external attribution of inner dialogue; inner speech becomes the
object, rather than the subject, of experience, resulting in the
emergence of voices (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012).
Researchers have recently highlighted a correspondence
between these phenomenological disturbances and findings
within the neurocognitive literature (Nelson et al., 2014a,b).
Specifically, it is suggested that disturbances of self-affection
are associated with source monitoring deficits (which result in
difficulty identifying self-generated events, and are proposed
to result in the misattribution of inner speech; Bentall, 1990),
whilst operative hyper-reflexivity correlates with compromised
memory-prediction processes (which promote excessive attention
to information that is irrelevant or highly familiar, a phenomenon
known as “aberrant salience”; Kapur, 2003). Indeed, errors on
source monitoring tasks are one of the most robust findings in
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relation to hallucinations; for example, Waters et al. (2012b) have
presented meta-analytic evidence that source monitoring/self-
recognition is impaired in patients with schizophrenia, and
particularly in those who hear voices. However, it is unclear
whether these neurocognitive disturbances constitute the neural
underpinnings of disturbed self-affection, or whether they lie
downstream from a more core alteration of basic self-experience
(Sass, 2014).
If a disorder of basic self-experience were primary, this would
help to explain phenomenological differences between inner
speech and voices (Parnas, 2003). Among the most characteristic
features of voices in psychosis are so-called “Schneiderian”
hallucinations (Daalman et al., 2011); a voice describing the
patient’s on-going behavior or experience, or two or more voices
discussing the patient in the third person. Such third-person
commentary is not a common feature of typical inner speech
(Langdon et al., 2009), creating problems for theories which
suggest that voices simply reflect misattributed inner speech.
Parnas suggests that the processes of diminished self-affection and
operative hyper-reflexivity result in a transformation in the nature
of inner speech; experiences of self-alienation result in a shift away
from inner speech referring to self-as-subject (e.g., “I need tomake
breakfast and get the kids to school in 20 min”) toward self-as-
object (e.g., “he’s going into the kitchen: : :: : :now he’s opening the
fridge: : :”). This “higher-level” inner speech (which reflects the
self-consciousness that generates self-alienation) is proposed to
form the content of Schneiderian hallucinations (Parnas, 2003).
However, whilst it might be expected from this account that
voice hearers should experience less “typical” inner speech than
non-voice hearers, a recent phenomenological study of inner
speech found that this is not the case (Langdon et al., 2009).
It is possible that inner speech referring to the hearer in the
second or third person is simply more likely than typical inner
speech to be misattributed; however, the potential reasons for this
are not specified within either the phenomenological or source
monitoring accounts of voice hearing.
The Reflective Self
The reflective self, also referred to as the core self (Damasio, 1999),
self-as-object (James, 1890) or objectified self (Sedikides and
Skowronski, 1997) refers to a primitive cognitive representation of
the self as the invariant and persisting subject pole of experience
and action (Parnas, 2003). This representation is accessed via
reflective consciousness (i.e., the capacity of an organism to
become the object of its own attention). This reflexive, or
metacognitive, capacity occurs at a substantially more explicit or
conscious level than the elementary sense of ipseity provided by
the pre-reflective self (Sedikides and Skowronski, 1997), but is
both derivative and dependent upon it (Parnas, 2003). Research in
individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia has found evidence
for disturbances in the reflexive consciousness that is central to
the functioning of the reflective self.
Phenomenological theorists such as Sass and Parnas (2003)
suggest that the lack of automatic identification of experiences as
one’s own (which results from diminished affection and operative
hyper-reflexivity at the level of the pre-reflective self—seeThePre-
reflective Self), may subsequently prompt more reflective forms
of hyper-reflexivity (Nelson et al., 2014b). Such “hyper-reflection”
(or increased conscious self-reflection) might occur as an in-the-
moment reaction (e.g., the sense that this “voice” did not originate
inme leads to reflection about its potential origins), but itmay also
turn into something more habitual, such as increased attentional
focus on particular elements of experience (Nelson et al., 2014b).
It has been proposed that these consequential and compensatory
processes may serve to further a sense of alienation and
diminished self-affection (Parnas, 2003), potentially reinforced by
the “objectifying” content of Schneiderian hallucinations. This
notion of hyper-reflection demonstrates clear parallels with self-
focused attention, which has been at the center of much cognitive
behavioral research (García-Montes et al., 2012). Thus, in support
of this phenomenological account, there is evidence that high
levels of self-focused attention are associated with the experience
of, or predisposition toward, hallucinations in both patients
(Morrison and Haddock, 1997; Ensum and Morrison, 2003)
and non-clinical participants (Allen et al., 2005). Furthermore,
Perona-Garcelán et al. (2008) demonstrated a positive correlation
between self-focused attention and dissociative experiences in
patients with hallucinations, but not in patients with psychoses
who have never experienced hallucinations.
Contemporary dialogical theories agree that processes such
as hyper-reflexivity and hyper-reflection contribute to basic
problemswith self-recognition of thoughts and emotions (Lysaker
et al., 2012), but they posit that these issues are further
compounded by additional metacognitive deficits, which can
result in an inability to see one’s own thoughts processes as
subjective and fallible (Dimaggio and Lysaker, 2015). Specifically,
Lysaker and Dimaggio (2014) propose a deficit in synthetic
metacognition; the capacity to recognize and integrate basic
elements of experience into complex representations of self
and others, and to adopt a superordinate meta-position which
allows one to question one’s beliefs and use one’s knowledge to
respond to psychosocial challenges. It can easily be imagined how
difficulties in adopting a superordinate stance might even serve
to promote further hyper-reflection around individual elements
of experience, further exacerbating anomalous experiences such
as voice hearing. In line with this view, people with a diagnosis
of schizophrenia have been found to experience trait like deficits
in the ability to form and use complex metacognitive self-
representations (Lysaker and Dimaggio, 2014), and reduced
metacognitive capacity to comprehend one’s own mental states
has been found to predict increased severity of auditory
hallucinations in people with psychosis (Lysaker et al., 2005).
The Narrative Self
The narrative self (Nelson et al., 2014), also referred to as the
symbolic (Sedikides and Skowronski, 1997; Chadwick, 2006),
social (Parnas, 2003) or autobiographical self (Damasio, 1999),
dynamic self-concept (Markus and Wurf, 1987) or personhood
(Stanghellini and Rosfort, 2015) refers to the collection of abstract
and language-based cognitive representations stored in memory
which serve to interpret and organize self-relevant actions and
experiences (Markus and Wurf, 1987). This is the level at which
themajority of cognitive behavioral research in psychosis has been
conducted (see Current Conceptualisations of “self ” in CBT for
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Psychosis). This level of self is widely understood to presuppose
the pre-reflective and reflective selves (Sedikides and Skowronski,
1997; Damasio, 1999; Nelson et al., 2014), and to rely on the
reflective self, in addition to a capacity for encoding and retrieving
episodic–autobiographical memories (Gallagher, 2003; Prebble
et al., 2013), for the development, consolidation, and refinement
of its content, structure and functions (Sedikides and Skowronski,
1997; Nelson et al., 2014).
As we have seen, cognitive models discuss how constructs
associated with the narrative self, such as low self-esteem and
negative self-beliefs, might influence the way in which anomalous
experiences, such as voice hearing, are interpreted (Waters et al.,
2012a). However, a recent meta-synthesis of qualitative accounts
of the lived experience of psychosis highlights the reported loss
of additional aspects associated with the narrative self, including
self-coherence and self-identity (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013b).
There has been much less emphasis within the cognitive literature
on how these higher level self-constructs might relate to psychotic
experiences such as voice hearing.
Salvatore et al. (2012b) have recently attempted to integrate
the cognitive and phenomenological conceptions of the role self-
experience in paranoia, suggesting that negative beliefs about self
as weak or vulnerablemay in fact emerge from, or be compounded
by, the pre-reflective self-disturbances discussed previously,
resulting in an experience of self as “ontologically vulnerable”
(Salvatore et al., 2012b). Stanghellini and Rosfort (2015) elaborate
on this idea, suggesting that “self-disorder, being at the core
of the vulnerability to schizophrenia, is refracted through the
prism of the person’s background of values and beliefs that
determine what things and events in the world mean for us” (p.
4). Whilst this idea demonstrates clear parallels with the cognitive
notion that the meaning and impact of anomalous experiences
are mediated by beliefs (Chadwick et al., 1996; Garety et al.,
2001), the phenomenological conception goes further to suggest
that anomalous pre-reflective self-experience may represent the
foundations on which both psychotic experiences and self-
identity are reciprocally constructed and appraised. Thinking
about voice hearing experiences specifically, experiencing the self
as “ontologically vulnerable” could serve to reinforce appraisals
of voice power, proposed by cognitive models to be an important
factor in determining voice-related distress (Birchwood et al.,
2000, 2004; Gilbert et al., 2001).
Similarly, dialogical theorists have elaborated significantly on
suggestions by Bentall (2003) and Chadwick (2006) in the
cognitive literature that the accessibility and dynamic interactions
between different self-representations is as important as the
content of these representations in determining functional
adaptation to anomalous experiences (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2002,
2004). Dimaggio et al. (2010) cite evidence from the clinical
and social psychology literature suggesting that psychological
health and social adaptation might depend on; (i) the existance
of a sufficient number of self-representations (or “positions”),
enabling a range of strategies for coping with the complexities
of social life; (ii) the ability to have conscious access to self-
representations that are context-relevant; (iii) the ability of
different self-representations to be aware of each other and
engage in a “dialogue” (achieved via inner speech) during inter-
and intra-personal exchanges; (iv) the ability of the person to
adopt a superordinate point of view, or metaposition, allowing an
adaptive decision or resolution to be achieved via the coordination
of and negotiation between different self-representations. In the
context of psychosis, it is suggested that the aforementioned
deficits in synthetic metacognition (see The Reflective Self) may
result in difficulties at each of these levels (Dimaggio et al., 2010;
Lysaker et al., 2012; Lysaker and Dimaggio, 2014) resulting in the
disturbances in self-coherence and self-identity described in the
psychosis literature, including an overly negative, disordered or
“barren” self- concept (Lysaker et al., 2012).
This theory predicts that individuals with a diagnosis of
psychosis might demonstrate disturbances in terms of; (i) self-
concept clarity (i.e., the degree to which one’s beliefs about one’s
attributes are clear, confidently held and cognitively accessible;
Stinson et al., 2008); (ii) self complexity (i.e., the number and
distinctiveness of accessible self-representations; Linville, 1987);
(iii) the complexity and/or phenomenology of inner speech. In
support of these suggestions, in non-clinical populations, low
self-concept clarity, in combination with a tendency toward
experiences of aberant salience (i.e., in which stimuli that
ordinarily would not seem significant become much more salient
and important; Kapur, 2003), is associated with an increased risk
of psychotic-like experiences (Cicero et al., 2013). In individuals
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, low self-concept clarity has
been found to predict higher levels of positive symptoms, lower
subjective quality of life and increased risk of perceived exposure
to stigmatization (Weinberg et al., 2012; Noyman-Veksler et al.,
2013). In relation to voice hearing specifically, Bell andWittkowski
(2009) found evidence for reduced positive self complexity in
voice hearers, and an association between higher positive self
complexity and increased psychological wellbeing. However, at
odds with the predictions of early dialogical theories, a recent
study found that the phenomenology of inner speech in voice
hearers does not differ significantly from that of non-clinical
participants (Langdon et al., 2009).
Perona-Garcelán et al. (2015) have suggested that, rather than
voice hearing experiences simply serving to disrupt the flow of
internal conversation (as suggested by Lysaker and Lysaker, 2005),
voices might in fact themselves be a product of the dissociation
of different self-positions. In this view, increased self-focused
attention/hyper-reflection on particular self-positions lead to a
loss of metacognitive perspective, whereby these self-positions
are no longer experienced as “belonging” to the owner. Instead,
certain self-positions are experienced as interpersonal “others,”
prompting individuals to interact with voices in a similar manner
to their interactions with others in the social environment.
Support for this view includes evidence of an increased tendency
toward dissociative experiences in voice hearers (Perona-Garcelán
et al., 2008); findings that voice hearing experiences share some
of the pragmatic properties of communication between people
(Leudar et al., 1997); and finally, evidence that the relationship
between the person and his or her voices is similar to the
relationship between individuals in a social context (Hayward,
2003). However,many questions still remain as to the nature of the
relationship between voice hearing experiences, inner dialogue
and disturbed higher-level self-concept.
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Targeting Self-experience in Voice Hearers
Researchers have recently highlighted the need to identify novel
targets for psychological therapy for distressing voices, given the
modest effects of CBT-based treatment approaches on both global
measures of voice hearing experiences, and outcomes related to
emotional dimensions of voices such as voice-related distress
(Thomas et al., 2014). The evidence outlined in the previous
section suggests that disturbances in self-experience occurring
at the pre-reflective, reflective and narrative levels are likely to
be intimately connected with the experience of voice hearing, in
terms of both etiology and functional and emotional adaptation,
and as such, may represent viable therapeutic targets in attempts
to provide relief from distressing voices.
It is worth noting that whilst CBT-based approaches have
tended to consider distress primarily as a consequence of hearing
voices, to be addressed by intervening with how voices are
appraised and responded to, it is likely that the relationship
between voice hearing, voice-related distress and emotional
distress more generally is complex, reciprocal, and difficult to
partition. It is possible that the limited impact of CBTp on
voice-related distress might reflect this complex relationship; for
example, the cognitive and behavioral mechanisms targeted by
CBTpmay well lie “downstream” of distress in the causal pathway,
or some latent third variable may underlie the emergence of both
voice hearing experiences and psychological distress. Considering
the contribution of self experience to this picture may be a
means of conceptualising broader ways in which voice experience
interacts with distress, rather than it merely being an adaptational
endpoint.
For example, it is likely that disrupted self-experience may in
itself be distressing formany voice hearers; the sense of ontological
vulnerability associated with pre-reflective self disturbance may
contribute to a basic feeling of unease with oneself, additional
stress whilst navigating social interactions with other people,
and reduced resilience in the face of critical voice content.
Further, distress and emotional arousal could directly serve to
influence pre-reflective self-experience, perhaps by disrupting
neurocognitive processes that ordinarily facilitate a stable, situated
sense of self.
As such, targeting aspects of self-experience might be expected
to have effects that extend beyond symptom-related distress, to
include many other facets of psychological distress. Indeed, many
current interventions for schizophrenia, psychosis, and distressing
voices incorporate methods that explicitly aim to target some
of these aspects of self-experience. Given the recent emphasis
within the literature on developing focused intervention methods
that aim to modify specific therapeutic targets and processes
(e.g., Thomas et al., 2014), we will now briefly consider what
therapeutic methods may be suited to targeting self-experience,
with reference to potential applications of components of current
interventions that have been described in the literature.
Pre-reflective Self
At the pre-reflective level of self-hood, interventions are required
that target the phenomenological disturbances proposed to
underlie anomalous self-experiences, voice hearing and other
psychotic symptoms, such as disrupted self-affection and hyper-
reflexivity (see The Pre-reflective Self).
Targeting Disrupted Self-affection and
Hyper-reflexivity
Two main approaches have been described which might enhance
basic sense of self (Nelson et al., 2014b). There is preliminary
evidence that reconstructive mind-body exercises (used within
body-oriented psychotherapy; Röhricht and Priebe, 2006) might
help to reduce basic self-disturbances in outpatients with a
diagnosis of schizophrenia, re-establishing a coherent sense
of embodied self, self-directed and vitalized social interaction
and emotional expressiveness (Röhricht et al., 2009). These
movement-based exercises enable participants to directly engage
with their bodies in order to recognize and articulate unusual
reflections suggestive of disembodiment, somatic disintegration
and other abnormal bodily sensations.Whilst itmight be expected
that the restored ipseity achieved by this approach might translate
into a reduction in voice hearing experiences and associated
distress, this possibility has yet to be explored.
A second approach is to correct neurocognitive processes
which may be contributing to disrupted self-affection and
hyper-reflexivity. There is a demonstrated association between
these phenomenological disturbances and deficits in attention,
sensory processing and source monitoring, and it has been
suggested that neurocognitive remediation therapies targeting
these mechanisms may be beneficial (Nelson et al., 2014a,b;
Postmes et al., 2014). Of course, the success of these approaches
will depend crucially upon the nature of the relationship
between these processes and self-disturbance; it is currently
unclear whether these neurocognitive correlates lie up- or down-
stream from alterations of basic self-experience (Sass, 2014).
If neurocognitive disturbances are causal in the genesis of
anomalous self-experience, and ipseity disturbances are related to
the emergence of voice hearing experience in the way proposed
by phenomenologists, cognitive remediation might be expected
to fundamentally alter the voice hearing experiences of those
undergoing treatment. However, again, the success of these
approaches in restoring basic self-experience, and any associated
impact on voices, has not yet been evaluated.
Reflective Self
Interventions can alternatively aim to target disturbances of self
consciousness proposed to underlie or reinforce disrupted self-
experience, such as hyper-reflection and impaired metacognitive
processing (see The Reflective Self).
Minimizing Hyper-reflection
Results of phenomenological investigations suggest that the sense
of loss of self in schizophrenia involves compromised first- and
second- person awareness, leaving affected individuals able only
to view themselves from “the outside” (Stanghellini and Lysaker,
2007). From the perspective of phenomenological researchers
such as Nelson and Sass (2009), the aim of psychological therapy
is to enable patients to “re-inhabit,” rather than objectify or
externalize, their experience, and to assist a patient in beginning
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to recapture the ability to engage in first- then second-person
experiences (Stanghellini and Lysaker, 2007). This approach
warns that traditional cognitive approaches, particularly those
which challenge the negative content of thoughts and schemas,
might exacerbate hyper-reflective processes, leading to increased
focus on the self as the object, rather than the subject, of
experience (Pérez-Álvarez et al., 2011).
Stanghellini and Lysaker (2007) outline four general principles
of phenomenonologically-informed therapy; (i) highlighting
disturbances of intersubjectivity; (ii) aiming at achieving a
shared partnership, (iii) focusing on the here-and-now, you-
and-I relationship, and (iv) pointing to shared meaningfulness.
This approach focuses on the promotion of the experience
of self in the second person as a necessary first step to
change. It is suggested that the primary task of the therapist
is promoting the construction of micro-narratives focussed on
real world situations, by consistently reflecting back a second-
person perspective on the person’s experiences (e.g., “you are
feeling bad”; “you feel that you can’t do anything right”).
The aim of these micro-narratives is to assist in dialogically
co-constructing a shared second-person view of the patients
experiences, improving the person’s capacity to sense experiences
as his or her own, reflect upon them, and take an intentional stance
over them, re-establishing disrupted immediate connectedness
between the self and the present situation (Stanghellini and
Lysaker, 2007).
Whilst the phenomenological conception warns against hyper-
reflective processes promoted by traditional cognitive therapy,
it additionally endorses strategies that stimulate a mindful
awareness and acceptance of subjective experiences, particularly
when these allow exploration of personal meaning (Pérez-
Álvarez et al., 2011). Such approaches may be particularly
helpful in addressing the contribution of “Schneidarian” voice
content toward the exacerbation of hyper-reflective processes.
Other recommended treatment approaches include those which
encourage gradual engagement in activities and social interaction,
thereby promoting a sense of immersion in present activity
(Nelson and Sass, 2009). Such approaches are seen as beneficial
not only in reducing hyper-reflection, but also in re-establishing
normal ipseity at a pre-reflective level, as they promote a
“forgetting” of the self as an objective focus of awareness, so that
a more foundational sense of oneself as a subjective perspective
on the world can be grounded (Nelson and Sass, 2009). Social and
occupational engagement are emphasized by a number of exisiting
interventions, for example Social Recovery Focused Cognitive
Therapy (Fowler et al., 2009), Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (Gaudiano et al., 2010) and Person Based Cognitive
Therapy (Chadwick, 2006), and may be particularly helpful for
voice hearers given evidence that the intensity of voice hearing
decreases during active engagement in leisure activity (Delespaul
et al., 2002).
Enhancing Metacognitive Awareness
Lysaker and Dimaggio (2014) suggest that interventions should
aim to help patients to recapture the ability to notice and
integrate the different elements thatmake upmental activities, and
to become capable of increasingly complex metacognitive acts.
Lysaker et al. (2011) suggest that the first step of a metacognition
oriented therapy (MOT) should be to assess a clients capacity for
self-reflectivity; for example, determining whether they are able
to notice that they have thoughts in their head, recognize these
thoughts as their own, distinguish between different cognitive
operations, and/or notice and identify their own feelings. This
is seen to be a critical first stage of therapy, since discussing
feelings or attempting to challenge cognitions when these cannot
be recognized is assumed to be counterproductive, perhaps
constibuting to frustration and distress on the part of both client
and therapist.
The second step of therapy is to offer interventions appropriate
to the patient’s current level of metacognitive functioning. Lysaker
et al. (2011) offer a variety of suggestions for interventions
appropriate to different levels of metacognitive capacity for self-
reflectivity, all of which use a consultative process in which the
therapist adopts a reflective, questioning stance in order to create a
space in which clients internal experiences can be openly thought
about (Bargenquast and Schweitzer, 2013). For example, if a client
is currently unable to determine whether there are thoughts in
their own mind, an appropriate approach might be to provide
reflections on the specific thoughts that a client may currently be
experiencing, based on what the client chooses to talk about. As
with the phenomenological approach, reflections in the second-
person are thought to be useful since these reflections implicitly
treat clients as participants in their lives, recognizing that they
are more than passive observers (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2011). If
a client is able to recognize and articulate different thoughts as
they arise, the focus of therapy would shift toward discussing and
reflecting back these specific mental operations, and supporting
the client to build these fragments into a more complex, coherent
and personalized narrative.
At higher levels of metacognitive functioning, interventions
may involve supporting clients to think about their or other’s
thinking and feelings in an ever more complex manner, by asking
questions such as “what was that like for you?” or “how do you
think that made  feel?” (Bargenquast and Schweitzer, 2013). At
the highest levels of self-reflectivity, the therapist aims to work
alongside the client to consider the fallibility of their thinking,
take a step back from firmly held ideas, and begin to consider
alternative world views. Again, points of internal debate can be
brought into focus by providing reflections based on ongoing
discussion, for example; it seems that there is a part of you that
believes , but also another part of you that has some doubts”
(Lysaker et al., 2011).
Whilst the effect of MOT on reducing distress and disruption
in relation to voice hearing experiences has yet to be directly
assessed, reductions in voice frequency have been observed in
individual case studies (Salvatore et al., 2012a), and it is likely
that such an approach would facilitate interventions aimed at
restoring processes of narrative self-construction (described in see
Targeting Higher-level Constructs: Self Esteem and Self Concept).
Furthermore, evidence from the delusions literature suggests that
similarmetacognitive training approaches can be used to promote
insight into the cognitive biases serving to maintain unusual
beliefs (Kumar et al., 2014), whichmay serve to augment cognitive
behavioral interventions for voice hearing.
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Narrative Self
Interventions operating at the narrative level can aim to target
lower-level constructs, such as the content, meaning, accessibility
and impact of positive and negative self schema, and/or to
influence the way in which these lower-level self representations
interact to produce higher-level constructs such as self-esteem,
self-concept and identity.
Modifying the Content, Meaning, and Impact of
Negative Self-schemas
Traditional cognitive approaches attempt to modify self-
schematic content. This starts with the collaborative formulation
of negative self-schema (Padesky, 1994; Chadwick, 2006) and is
followed by the use of Socratic techniques to review and evaluate
evidence (naturally occuring evidence as well as evidence
gathered through behavioral experiments) as to the accuracy
of negative self-schemas (Padesky, 1993) and/or to strengthen
positive self beliefs, such as beliefs about personal power and
status relative to voices (Trower et al., 2004).
However, modifying negative schematic content might not
always be possible, as this content may be stored in memory
in a way that is not easily amenable to change (Hayes, 2004;
Brewin, 2006; Longmore and Worrell, 2007). An alternative
approach with the narrative self is to modify meta-cognitive
beliefs about negative schematic experiences using a combination
of behavioral, mindfulness- and acceptance-based methods—that
is, shifting away from the meta-cognitive belief that self-schema
are literal truths about self and toward a recognition of their
contradictory, transient and non-literal nature. Paul Chadwick’s
“two chair method” aims to highlight the transient and non-
literal nature of self-schematic experiences through promoting
metacognitive distancing from these experiences (Chadwick,
2003, 2006). Adapted mindfulness practice, metaphors and
experiential exercises can be used to further facilitate re-appraisal
of the status, rather than the content, of negative self-schema
(Chadwick, 2006; Thomas et al., 2013).
In addition to modifying meta-cognitive beliefs about
self-schema, habituation to schematic distress (as opposed
to changing content) has also been proposed. Strategies
demonstrated to be effective for voice hearers include shame
attacking exercises (drawn from Rational Emotive Therapy)
which create opportunities through repeated voluntary exposure
to feel and accept how schematic distress can be tolerated, and
will habituate (Chadwick, 2006).
Finally, approaches that enhance self-compassion are showing
promise for people experiencing psychosis in reducing distress
and social marginalization (Braehler et al., 2013), with benefits
also found specifically for people hearing voices (Mayhew and
Gilbert, 2008). Compassion-focused therapy (CFT; Gilbert, 2009)
does not directly aim to alter self-schematic content but rather
attempts to enhance self-soothing and to dampen activation of the
threat system through compassion-focused exercises. Similarly,
one of the mechanisms of mindfulness-based approaches appears
to be through enhanced self-compassion (Gu et al., 2015) and
this may be due to the emphasis on acceptance and non-
judgement, including of self-schematic experiences, in these
approaches. Approaches that enhance self-compassion therefore
have potential to reduce the impact of negative self-schematic
experiences as the person learns to self-sooth and to accept and
not judge these experiences.
Given the demonstrated links between negative self-schema
and voices (Close and Garety, 1998; Birchwood et al., 2000, 2004;
Barrowclough et al., 2003; Fox et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2006), such
treatment approaches might be expected to influence the content,
appraisal and impact of voice hearing experiences, in addition to
addressing any independent contribution of negative self-schema
to wellbeing.
Enhancing the Accessibility and Content of Positive
Self-schemas
Many researchers have argued that work on negative self-schema
should be complimented by attempts to enhance awareness of
and strengthen conviction in positive self-schema (e.g., Chadwick,
2006). Furthermore, demonstrated associations between positive
self-schema and positive beliefs about voices (Thomas et al.,
2015) are consistent with the suggestion that attempts to enhance
positive self-schemas might have an impact on voice appraisals,
although the causal direction of these effects is not yet known and
is likely to be complicated.
Traditional CBT methods such as evidence gathering
(historical, in current daily life and through behavioral tasks) and
mental rehearsal can be used to strengthen conviction in and
accessibility of positive schema (Tarrier, 2001; Hall and Tarrier,
2003), including self-efficacy beliefs such as “I have some control
even when voices are around” (Morrison et al., 2004; Chadwick,
2006).
Other techniques aim to increase the accessibility of positive
self-schema. For example, the two chair method used within
PBCT allows patients to articulate and “embody” positive
schema whilst momentarily distancing themselves from negative
schematic experiences (Chadwick, 2003). A similar approach is
used within Competitive Memory Training (COMET; van der
Gaag et al., 2012), whereby patients are asked to repeatedly
recollect and relive past experiences in which they felt successful
or competent. This “re-living” involves imagining these positive
experiences whilst adopting a congruent posture and facial
expression and (sub) vocalizing a congruent positive self-
statement (van der Gaag et al., 2012).
A final approach is to promote the development of new positive
schematic content. Since the development and maintenance
of self-schema are dependent upon interpersonal experience
(Markus and Wurf, 1987), behavioral approaches which promote
social and occupational engagement (e.g., Hodgekins and Fowler,
2010) or target assertiveness and communication skills (Hayward
et al., 2009) could all potentially contribute to the development of
new positive schematic content.
Targeting Higher-level Constructs: Self Esteem and
Self Concept
Whilst attempts have been made to directly target higher-level
concepts such as self esteem (Lecomte et al., 1999), it has
been suggested these constructs may be more helpfully viewed
as treatment outcomes (or intermediaries between target and
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outcome), rather than targets for intervention per se (Hayes
et al., 2013). It has been proposed that such “global” or
“aggregate” concepts subsume a number of lower-level constructs,
which might represent more viable targets for intervention
(Kazdin, 2007; Hayes et al., 2013). In line with this idea,
the most robust improvements in self-esteem in those with a
psychosis diagnosis have been demonstrated in an intervention
targeting the accessibility of positive self-schema (Hall and
Tarrier, 2003). Similarly, improvements in self-concept clarity
and complexity are most likely to be achieved by targeting the
processes via which lower-level self-representations interact and
integrate to form complex and consciously accessible higher-
level self-constructs (Dimaggio et al., 2010). Since this process
is likely to rely upon reflexive capacities, restoration of synthetic
metacognitive awareness using the techniques outlined previously
(see Enhancing Metacognitive Awareness) is proposed to provide
a platform for further narrative self-construction (Chadwick,
2006; Lysaker and Dimaggio, 2014).
Beyond the enhancement of metacognitive capacities,
the process of self-construction can be facilitated using a
number of techniques. The two-chair method provides an
opportunity for clients to explore the interactions between newly
elaborated positive and negative self-schema, allowing their
eventual integration within a new metacognitive model of self
as complex and changing (Chadwick, 2006; Dannahy et al.,
2011). Alternatively, narrative metacognitive therapies place
an emphasis on enhancing the client’s capacity for dialogical
self-narration (Bargenquast and Schweitzer, 2013). This approach
aims to first enhance the client’s awareness of themselves as
storyteller by encouraging narration of their experience in-
session, and exploring and expanding upon story fragments
expressed by the client. As in metacognition oriented therapy,
techniques such as reflection and questioning are used to facilitate
the discovery of undeveloped or suppressed self-aspects, and to
develop complexity in a client’s narratives. Therapy additionally
aims to target problems with dialogue between different self-
positions, by collaboratively exploring and connecting material
discussed within the current and previous sessions, highlighting
the existence of alternative and potentially conflicting self facets,
and modeling functional interpersonal dialogue in-session
(Lysaker and Lysaker, 2011). Finally, addressing the content
and meaning of voice hearing experiences within a broader
life narrative is likely to be an important element of therapy, a
perspective that is emphasized by approaches associated with the
Hearing Voices Movement (e.g., Corstens et al., 2008; Longden
et al., 2012).
Key Research Questions
Future research should aim to validate and refine this model
within voice hearers in order to improve intervention strategies.
A number of key research questions can be identified.
What is the Relationship Between Self- and
Voice-experience?
Whilst there is good evidence for disturbances occurring at
all three levels of self in people with psychosis, the extent to
which these various disturbances in self-experience are related
specifically to (i) voice hearing experiences and (ii) voice-related
distress and disruption is currently unclear. In order to determine
the specific role of disrupted self-experience in voice hearing
experiences, future research should first seek to compare the
prevalence and nature of these experiences in people with a
diagnosis of psychosis who hear, or do not hear, voices.
This research should start with an in-depth exploration of the
phenomenology of self- and voice-experience (McCarthy-Jones
et al., 2013a), and subsequently extend beyond an assessment
of the role of negative self-schema and low trait self-esteem, to
include both lower- and higher-level aspects of self-experience
such as disturbed ipseity, metacognitive awareness and various
dimensions of self-concept (Tiernan et al., 2014). In doing so,
it will be important to return to the social psychology literature
in order to clarify the conceptual and theoretical relationship
between different constructs such as implicit and explicit self-
esteem, self-concept complexity, clarity and flexibility. One reason
for doing so is the evidence of a close relationship between self-
concept clarity and state self-esteem (Campbell, 1990; Nezlek and
Plesko, 2001), which might have important implications for how
to target low self-esteem in voice hearers.
Understanding of the role of these experiences in voice-related
distress and disruption will be aided by an exploration of the
nature and prevalence of disturbed self-experience across the
voice hearing continuum (for example, in voice hearers with
diagnoses other than psychosis, and in those without any need for
care). Not only can such an approach be helpful toward identifying
key targets for psychological therapy, but given the suggestion that
a disturbance of the basic sense of self is a phenotypic trait marker
of psychotic vulnerability, might also inform future strategies for
early intervention (Nelson et al., 2009).
What is the Direction of any Relationship
Between Self- and Voice-experience?
The cross-sectional research outlined above will determine
whether disturbances in self-experience are a reliable trait marker
of distressing voice hearing experiences, but such approaches
say little about (a) the temporal association between these
experiences; (b) the directionality of this relationship. Whilst
disrupted self-experience is likely to represent a worthy treatment
target in its own right, as it can in itself lead to distress and
disruption to quality of life, such interventions will have limited
impact on voice hearing experiences or associated distress if
changes in self-experience are a consequence, rather than a cause
of voices.
The temporal association between voice hearing and disrupted
self-experience can be assessed using longitudinal approaches that
compare the nature of self-experience in; (i) current and past voice
hearers, (ii) people within and outside of voice hearing episodes.
However, such approaches are still reliant on traitmeasures of self-
experience and voices, and there is good evidence that both voices
and self-experiences are likely to vary within-person (i.e., they are
state variables; Nezlek and Plesko, 2001; Thewissen et al., 2011).
Therefore, of potentially greater relevance to the development
of effective psychological interventions for distressing voices is
whether various disturbances in self-experience are associated
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with, and indeed predictive of, the onset of voices during the
course of daily life.
Micro-longitudinal momentary assessment approaches such as
the ESM (Csikszentmihalyi and Larson, 1987; Oorschot et al.,
2009) can shed light on the dynamic relationship between
voices, self-experience, and contextual factors (i.e., potential
triggers), providing an indication of directionality. McCarthy-
Jones et al. (2013a) suggest that ESM could be used to assess
the locus of attention of voice-hearers immediately preceding
AVHs, potentially revealing whether these experiences are indeed
characterized by hyper-reflective processes as suggested by Sass
(2003). Such an approach could additionally be used to determine
the daily dynamics of the association between voice hearing
experiences and (i) altered states of pre-reflective self-awareness
(such as dissociation) and (ii) negative self- and social-appraisals
at the level of the narrative self. ESM could also be used to
shed light on the extent to which disrupted self-experience may
contribute to distress and dysfunction independently of voice
hearing experiences. Given evidence that low self-esteem predicts
depression independently of voice appraisals (Fannon et al., 2009),
this is likely to be an important consideration when working with
voice hearers.
In addition to establishing the temporal relationship between
self- and voice-hearing experiences, it will be important to
investigate their developmental relationship. Determining the
developmental pathways of voice hearing experiences can
shed light on potential treatment targets at different stages
during development, in addition to having implications for
early identification and intervention for voice hearers who are
at greater risk of developing a future need for care. Raballo
and Larøi (2011) have provided evidence from first-person
accounts that anomalous self-experiences could prelude to the
development of distressing voices. Furthermore, evidence of a
link between both voices and dissociation (a disruption to pre-
reflective self-experience) and early traumatic experiences (Varese
et al., 2012) hints toward a potential common developmental
origin. Prospective epidemiological studies can shed further
light on whether disturbances in self-experience precede
voices developmentally (or vice versa), and the relationship
between these experiences and environmental and demographic
factors.
What Mechanisms Underlie the Relationship
Between Self- and Voice-experience?
Future research should additionally seek to determine the
nature of the cognitive processes and neurocognitive mechanisms
underlying operations occurring at different levels of selfhood.
For example, it will be important to determine the nature of
the neurocognitive processes underlying diminished self-affection
and operative hyper-reflexivity, and of disturbances at the level
of the reflective self. Such research can determine the degree
to which these phenomena are influenced by context, or are
neurologically determined, and thus shed light on potential
targets for neurocognitive remediation therapies, which have
been demonstrated to be effective in improving global cognition,
functioning and symptoms in individuals with a diagnosis
of schizophrenia (Wykes et al., 2011). Sass (2014) suggests
that psychological manipulations of self-experience (e.g., using
meditative techniques or introspection) might help to determine
associations with symptoms, neurocognitive performance, and
neural correlates in healthy individuals and voice hearers. Such
experimental findings could be triangulated with real-time
quantitative data obtained using ESM approaches (Eisenberger
et al., 2007), in order to identify the neurocognitive correlates of
disturbed self-experience during daily life.
A further question is how operations at these different levels
of self might interact in the experience of voice hearing. Whilst it
is helpful to conceptualise voice hearing experiences in relation
to processes occurring at the three levels of selfhood described
previously, it is important to emphasize that in reality there are no
clear boundaries between these levels, and all interact to produce
a dynamic experience of self (Sedikides and Skowronski, 1997).
Such an interaction between operations occurring at the different
levels of self is consistent with recent neurocognitive models of
voice hearing (Waters et al., 2012a; Aleman and Vercammen,
2013), which propose that auditory hallucinations are caused by
a blend of distorted input from bottom-up sensory information
and aberrant top-down factors (including prior knowledge and
memories, perceptual expectations, and mental imagery).
Preliminary evidence suggests that self-representations at the
level of narrative self might have a “top-down” influence upon
the interpretation of anomalous self-experiences occurring at a
pre-reflective level (Synofzik et al., 2008; Cicero et al., 2013),
and likewise, it has been suggested that disturbances occurring
at the pre-reflective and reflective levels of self-hood contribute
fundamentally to the formation of idiosyncratic beliefs at the
level of the narrative self (Nelson et al., 2014; Stanghellini and
Rosfort, 2015). Both anomalous self-experiences and higher-
level self-narratives will additionally motivate behaviors (such as
avoidance) which may serve to reinforce both lower- and higher-
level self disturbance. Empirical investigation of these ideas will
serve to further enrich psychological models of voice hearing.
How Can Self-experience be Targeted in
Therapy?
Whilst many current interventions for schizophrenia, psychosis,
and distressing voices incorporate methods that explicitly aim to
target aspects of self-experience, few studies have investigated;
(a) whether these multicomponent interventions are effective
in modifying self-related constructs; (b) whether such changes
mediate therapeutic gains; (c) which specific therapeutic elements
are responsible for these changes.
These are important questions for future research, given
recent calls to improve the scientific basis of interventions for
distressing voices (Thomas et al., 2014). One approach is to
incorporate measurement of self-related treatment targets and
mechanisms within the context of RCTs of interventions such as
CBTp. However, with self-experience representing one of many
targets, and without standardization of the extent to which this
is addressed during therapy, this is likely to provide a relatively
indirect test.
Research in this field would be aided by the use of dismantling
approaches to determine the impact of existing techniques
within multi-component interventions (Kazdin, 2007), and
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interventionist-causal approaches (Kendler and Campbell, 2009;
Freeman, 2011), in which specific aspects of self-experience are
targeted experimentally in order to determine whether changes
in voice experience and its impact can be produced. Such
targeted proof-of-concept intervention studies can provide an
early indication of which targets are most amenable to change
prior to full-scale RCTs (Hayes et al., 2013). However, these
approaches require attention to the best operationalization and
measurement of outcomes, both in terms of the aspects of self
that are being targeted and how to conceptualise and measure
voice-related outcomes (Thomas et al., 2014).
Conclusion
This paper has introduced a framework for conceptualising the
role of self-experience in voice hearing. Whilst there is emerging
evidence for associations between various aspects of disturbed
self-experience in voice hearing, and preliminary attempts to
target some elements of self-experience in interventions for voices,
further research is required to understand the directionality of
this relationship, and its potential for therapeutic intervention.
Multi-disciplinary approaches will be central to developing our
understanding of the role of self-experience in distressing voices.
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